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EXPANDING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS
Kathleen S. Morris*
ABSTRACT
This Article calls on Congress and the state legislatures to grant
large cities and counties standing to enforce the Federal Trade
Commission Act (the FTC Act) and its state statutory counterparts
(or little Acts). The FTC Act, a federal law, prohibits businesses
from engaging in any "unlawful," "unfair," or "deceptive" acts or
practices, and the little Acts apply similarly broad prohibitions in all
fifty states. This fifty-one-statute consumer protection regime-
which has been the law of the land for several decades-carries
enormous promise to halt a wide range of unlawful and harmful
corporate practices in their earliest stages. Unfortunately, that
promise has not been fulfilled because these laws are chronically
under-enforced. At present, only one federal agency-the Federal
Trade Commission-has broad standing to enforce the FTC Act;
while state Attorneys General and consumers typically have standing
to enforce the little Acts, they cannot keep up with the rate of
corporate malfeasance. This Article argues that the nation's
legislatures should invite cities and counties with populations over
50,000 into consumer protection enforcement by granting them
standing to seek injunctive relief and penalties under the FTC Act
and little Acts. It addresses the practical benefits and barriers to
disaggregating consumer protection enforcement in this way and
discusses the attendant localism and federalism concerns.
TABLE OF CONTENTS .
Introduction ................................ ..... 1904
I. The Current Consumer Protection Enforcement Regime and
Its Limitations .......................... ..... 1909
A. The FTC Act.................. ............ 1909
1903
1904 FORDHAM URB. L. [Vol. XL
B. The Little Acts .................... ............. 1910
C. Barriers to Local Legislation .................. 1912
D. Barriers to Private Enforcement Actions ..... ..... 1913
E. Why Consider Local (Rather than Additional State or
Federal) Consumer Protection Enforcement? ................ 1915
II. Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal
Consumer Protection Laws.............. ... ..... 1916
A. Municipal Right of Action Under FTC Act.....................1916
B. Municipal Right of Action Under the Little Acts...........1916
C. Practical Barriers to Local Consumer Protection
Enforcement ............................. 1919
1. Politics. .......................... ..... 1919
2. Money ......................... ......1921
3. Culture .................................1922
4. Sophistication. ..................... .....1922
III. Theoretical Concerns Disaggregation Raises.. ............1923
A. Localism Concerns: What About Local Autonomy?......1923
B. Federalism Concerns: Uniformity, Over-Enforcement,
and Parochialism ............................. 1926
Conclusion ................................. ..... 1927
Appendix ................................. ...... 1928
INTRODUCTION
The nation's consumer protection regime is broken.! The problem
is not a lack of good law: federal and state legislatures have enacted
* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. For their comments
on this Article, I thank the student editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal and
the faculty and student participants in the 2013 Fordham Urban Law Journal
Symposium. For helpful discussions, I thank Heather Gerken, Kaitlin Ainsworth,
and Erin Bernstein. For their terrific work compiling the attached Appendix, I thank
Yale Law School students Daniel Isaacs, Edwina Clarke, Deborah Megdal, Laura
Raposo, and Celia Rhoads. For excellent research assistance, I thank Golden Gate
University School of Law student William Doyle.
1. By "consumer protection" I mean any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practice
by a corporation that harms consumers, investors, or competitors. This Article
assumes that consumer protection laws should be enforced in a manner that
maximizes the "public interest," by which I mean not only the physical but also the
economic health and safety of consumers and the economy. See Amy Widman,
Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of
State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 165, 189 (2010) ("Defining
'public interest' is difficult. . . . In the context of consumer protection, the public
CONSUMER PROTECTION LA WS
far-reaching consumer protection statutes, most notably the
expansive Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act or the Act)2
and its state statutory counterparts (the little Acts).? The problem is
that due to insufficient funding and staffing,4 industry capture, or
some combination of both,' these potentially powerful bodies of
consumer protection law are woefully under-enforced.
interest largely consists of the health and safety of consumers, and anti-public-
interest behavior is the absence of regulation or enforcement.") (citing the "activist
theory of regulation" described in Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Pivatizing
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment Of Citizen Suits Under Federal
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 884-89 (1985)).
2. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting
all "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"). The
Act makes "unfair" or "deceptive" acts or practices unlawful (illegal acts or practices
are per se "unfair"). As the Act's language suggests, it is capable of operating either
substantively or procedurally. When used as a procedural vehicle for enforcing other
laws, it is conceptually akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), though aimed at corporate
rather than government malfeasance.
3. See Appendix for a list of every state's so-called "little FTC Act." California's
Act has arguably the broadest language, which prohibits "any unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising and any [specified] act prohibited by Chapter 1." CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17200 Some state statutes create a more specific laundry list of unfair
practices. See Appendix.
4. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies.: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REV. 15, 65 (2010) (describing the federal Consumer
Products Safety Commission (CPSC), which Congress created more than forty years
ago, as "chronically underfunded and understaffed"); see also Philip G. Schrag, On
Her Majesty's Secret Service. Protecting The Consumer In New York City, 80 YALE
L.J. 1529, 1530 (1971) ("Inadequate funding, understaffing, weak legislation, lack of
public support, over-bureaucratization and the absence of any real sense of mission
conspired to render government agencies ineffective or, in some cases, servants of
industry, while consumer fraud flourished.").
5. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 16 (describing consumer protection in particular
as "a breeding ground for capture").
6. See id. at 16, 17-18, 65 (blaming both industry capture and lack of funding and
staffing for failures of the federal banking and consumer agencies).
7. See id. at 15, 65-72 (detailing forty years of failed efforts by the Consumer
Products Safety Commission); see also LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, NAT'L CONSUMER
LAW CrR., PREEMPTION AND REGULATORY REFORM: RESTORE THE STATES'
TRADITIONAL ROLE As "FIRST RESPONDER" 15 (2009), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf
(arguing that over time the credit marketplace-in such areas as mortgages,
overdraft fees, and overall lending--has developed a "culture of deception" fueled in
part by under-enforcement of state law due to federal preemption); Widman, supra
note 1, at 179-91 (documenting how lax federal enforcement has compromised
consumer protection and weakened the Consumer Product Safety Commission).
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At present, the FTC Act is enforced almost exclusively by the FTC
itself.' The Act does not provide for a private right of action or public
rights of action by state or local governments (unlike, for example,
the Clean Air Act).' Furthermore, among the fifty little Acts, only
seven permit city and county enforcement," and only eleven permit
district attorney enforcement." This paper calls for Congress and the
state legislatures to extend consumer protection enforcement
standing to cities and counties with populations over 50,000.12
For several decades, scholars and policy experts have pointed out
the enormous gaps in consumer protection enforcement, and called
for a more effective approach. Nearly half a century ago, Ralph
Nader's book Unsafe at Any Speed spurred broad efforts to protect
consumers. Ten years after Mr. Nader published his book, Ann
8. The only exception to FTC enforcement is that the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency enforces the Act against the banking industry. See generally Fredric
J. Bendremer, Applicability of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
National Banks, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 189 (2003).
9. See Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of N.M., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir.
1983) (noting the absence of a private right of action under the FTC Act); Dreisbach
v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. V.
Interstate Cigar Co. 499 F. 2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (same). In sharp contrast, the
federal civil rights statute provides for a private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and Clean Air Act provide for not only a
private but a public-including municipal--right of action. See Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7604(a)(1) (2006); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
60121, 60101(a)(17) (2006).
10. Those states are California, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia. See Appendix.
11. Those states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. District attorneys
are often hybrid state-local creatures, in that they are technically state actors but
elected by a local constituency. As Ann Marie Tracey argued long ago, prosecutors
would also make logical partners in consumer protection enforcement. See Ann
Marie Tracey, Consumer Protection: An Expanded Role for the Local Prosecutor, 44
U. CIN. L. REv. 81, 81-82 (1975). But some have suggested that prosecutors may be
uncomfortable criminalizing consumer protection violations. See William F.
Mulroney, Deceptive Practices In The Marketplace: Consumer Protection by New
York Government Agencies, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 491, 496 (1974).
12. I suggest drawing the line at 50,000 to allow for participation by at least one
city or county in each of the fifty states. The smallest such jurisdiction is the city of
San Marcos, Texas (population 50,001). Largest Cities by Population-Full List,
BIGGESTUSCITIES.COM, http://www.biggestuscities.com/?full=1 (last visited Oct. 16,
2013). This measure would permit consumer protection enforcement by roughly 700
cities and 1000 counties. See Largest Cities by Population, supra; Population of US
Counties, DEMOCRAT & CHRON., http://rocdocs.democratandchronicle.com/database/
population-us-counties (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
13. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
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Marie Tracey pointed out that "[c]onsumer laws are not self-
executing," and called for local criminal prosecution of consumer
rights violations.14 In the nearly four decades since then, politicians"
and scholars" have joined consumer rights advocates to rally for
better and stronger consumer protection.
Unfortunately, public and private efforts to rein in corporate
abuses have fallen short. As Rachel Barkow wrote, "[Pu]blic interest
advocacy groups ... are no match for the resources and political clout
of the industries that oppose consumer protection laws."' 7  If
anything, unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent corporate practices are
becoming increasingly more widespread, complex, and damaging to
the economy." Cities and counties pay an enormous price for
corporate lawbreaking, 9 yet can do very little about it. They cannot
enforce existing laws, and powers and preemption doctrines, along
with public policy concerns, constrain local legislation. Accordingly,
the only real-and arguably ideal-role for cities and counties is as
active enforcers of state and federal law.
This Article is not the first to consider the potential benefits and
pitfalls of disaggregated civil law enforcement. In recent years legal
scholars including Amy Widman, Rachel Barkow, Gillian Metzger,
and Margaret Lemos have written either about state enforcement of
federal law in general,20 or more particularly, state enforcement of
federal consumer protection statutes.2' And as early as 2006,
14. See Tracey, supra note 11, at 81-82.
15. In 1985, the late Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio introduced a bill
providing for state attorney general enforcement of the FTC Act. See Thomas W.
Queen, Recent Developments in Federal Antitrust Legislation, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
383, 394 (1985). That bill was never enacted into law.
16. See, e.g., Tracey, supra note 11, at 81-82.
17. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 65.
18. Corporate malfeasance in the financial services industry is perhaps the most
egregious recent example of unchecked corporate power. See generally CHARLES
GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT: How THREE DECADES OF WALL STREET GREED AND
GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
(2009).
19. See generally THIERRY PAULAIS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/
citiesalliance.org/files/Paulais LocalGovernmentsandtheFinancialCrisisEng.pdf
(documenting the devastating impact of the financial crisis on local governments).
20. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86
N.Y.U. L. REv. 698 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency
Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011).
21. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 65. See generally Widman, supra note 1.
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Kathleen Engel called on state legislatures to disaggregate the
enforcement of state lending laws.22
This Article fills a gap in the existing literature by considering
whether cities and counties should have standing to enforce the Act
and little Acts; and by discussing the theoretical implications for
localism and federalism of disaggregating consumer protection
enforcement to cities and counties. This Article begins to fill those
gaps in the literature. On the policy front, it suggests that Congress
and state legislatures should grant cities and counties of over 50,000
people standing to enforce the FTC Act and the little Acts.23 On the
theoretical front, it addresses localism (and briefly, federalism)
concerns, disaggregated enforcement raises, and explains why
pushing more power to the local level in the consumer area may serve
rather than undercut a healthy localism.24 It argues that a healthy
modern localism's ultimate goal is to maximize local power, not
necessarily local autonomy, and that in the consumer protection
context the most sensible way to increase local power is by allowing
local enforcement of state and federal laws rather than enacting and
defending local laws against preemption.
As Nestor Davidson wrote, "[a]t the heart of cooperative localism
is the potential-which will not be realized in all instances-of an
alchemical reaction that can be sparked when national goals are
filtered through the instrumentality of local communities."25 This
Article challenges policymakers and scholars to consider that
potential in the context of consumer protection enforcement. It
proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the Act and little Acts and
22. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing The
Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 359-60 (2006).
23. This Article focuses exclusively on local public enforcement of the FTC Act
and parallel state statutes. It does not address local enforcement of other state and
federal laws or private enforcement of the FTC Act.
24. This Article's localism discussion mirrors an active debate among federalism
scholars-led by Heather Gerken-about whether and how democracy and
federalist theories can and should account for localities. See generally Heather K.
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013); Heather K. Gerken,
The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 941 (2013); Heather K.
Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).
25. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1033 (2007); Roderick M. Hills Jr.,
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) ("[Tlhe benefits of federalism in the present and in the
future will rest on how the federal and state governments will interact, not in how
they act in isolation from each other.").
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current barriers to public and private enforcement. Part II proposes
local government enforcement of the Act and little Acts, and
considers the practical barriers to and benefits of this proposal. Part
III addresses the theoretical concerns this proposal raises.
I. THE CURRENT CONSUMER PROTECTION ENFORCEMENT
REGIME AND ITS LIMITATIONS
A. The FTC Act
Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or
Commission) in 1914 as an independent agency to enforce the Act.
The Act has existed more or less in its present form since 1938.26 The
Act's operative language, commonly referred to as "section 5,"
broadly prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices."2 7 The Commission has described the
factors it considers in determining whether a practice that is neither
unlawful nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other
words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen).u
This language is strikingly flexible and far-reaching, and Congress
and the federal courts grant the FTC broad sway in fashioning rules
to effectuate and enforce section 5.29 Moreover, the Act is a civil
rather than criminal statute, so liability is established under the
relatively low preponderance standard. The Act does not limit the
types of corporations plaintiffs may sue or the types of practices
plaintiffs may challenge.
26. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1965) (explaining
the history of the Act).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
28. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
408).
29. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (holding
that the FTC may prohibit conduct under § 5 even if it violates neither the letter nor
the spirit of any more specific federal laws).
2013] 1909
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But the Act has a glaring enforcement limitation: only the FTC has
broad authority to enforce the Act.30 Unlike other federal statutes,
the Act does not allow private rights of action, public rights of action
by state attorneys general, or public rights of action by local public
entities." The FTC has just seven regional divisions-in Cleveland,
Chicago, New York, Seattle, Atlanta, Dallas, and Los Angeles-San
Francisco-to cover the entire nation.32 The FTC's modest regional
presence surely contributes to its limited effectiveness.33
B. The Little Acts
Each of the fifty states has passed some version of the F.T.C Act.34
These laws have some substantive variation, presumably because
each statute is tailored to the politics and policy preferences of its
particular state." As for their enforcement provisions, an
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 16921(a) (2012). See generally FTC, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2008: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (2008),
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/PO84802fdcpareport.pdf (noting that while §
1692(b) grants very narrow standing to other federal agencies, they rarely have cause
to enforce the Act).
31. See Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of N.M. 703 F. 2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir.
1983) (noting the absence of a private right of action under the FTC Act); Dreisbach
v. Murphy, 658 F. 2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate
Cigar Co., 499 F. 2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (same). By contrast, to take just two
examples, the federal civil rights statute provides for a private right of action against
public actors who commit civil rights violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Similarly, the Clean Water Act and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act provides for
private and public rights of action to enforce that statute and regulations
promulgated thereunder:
A person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the
United States for an injunction against another person (including the
United States Government and other governmental authorities to the extent
permitted under the 11th amendment to the Constitution) for a violation of
this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter.
49 U.S.C. § 60121 (2006). "Person" is defined broadly to include states and
municipalities. See 49 U.S.C. § 60101(a)(17).
32. See FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION (2013), available atwww.ftc.gov/bcpfbcp-org-chart.pdf.
33. See James J. Pulliam, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market Competitos, UDAP
Consumer Protection Laws, and the US. Mortgage Crisis, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1251,
1255-56 (2010) (arguing that under-enforcement of the little Acts has contributed to
harmful, unlawful business practices, and calling for business competitor standing to
sue).
34. See Appendix.
35. States also have common law tort theories that can be applied in the consumer
protection area, such as fraud, nuisance, and unjust enrichment. See Engel, supra
note 22, at 367. This Article focuses on statutes because, to the extent a consumer
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overwhelming number of little Acts rely on a combination of state
government enforcement" and private rights of action3 7 to effectuate
their provisions.38 Only fifteen of the fifty states allow any kind of
local enforcement of consumer protection laws: seven states allow at
least some city and county (civil) consumer protection enforcement
(California, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas,
and Virginia); 9 eleven states allow district attorneys-often a hybrid
of state and local"-to pursue (criminal) enforcement (Alabama,
California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas).41 Some of these states
limit the local public entities that can bring suit, and/or incorporate
procedural safeguards such as requiring prior state certification of
localities as enforcement agents,42 prior approval by the state before
filing suit,43 or prior notification to the state before filing suit," but at
least make use of some local law enforcement resources. By contrast,
protection statute prohibits "unlawful" acts, it provides a vehicle for enforcing all
statutory and common law.
36. Most state statutes contemplate enforcement by the Attorney General and
State's attorneys; some also have state officers specifically charged with enforcement.
See Appendix.
37. Forty-two states' consumer protection laws contemplate private enforcement
by persons harmed. They are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. See Appendix. Five states do not provide for private enforcement.
They are: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, and Maine. See id
38. Only one state-Minnesota--relies entirely on private enforcement. See id
39. See id. As Ann Marie Tracey argued long ago, prosecutors are also logical
partners in consumer protection enforcement. See Tracey, supra note 11, at 81-82.
But prosecutors tend to be experts in criminal rather than civil law enforcement, and
some have suggested prosecutors may be uncomfortable criminalizing economic
wrongdoing. See Mulroney, supra note 11, at 496.
40. In many states, district attorneys are technically state actors, but they are
elected and paid by local governments.
41. See Appendix. Unfortunately, it seems that prosecutors are not only
stretched thin, but are also often uncomfortable with charging consumer protection
violations criminally, so it may not make sense to grant them exclusive enforcement.
See Mulroney, supra note 11, at 496.
42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56.8-14.1 (West 2012).
43. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (1976).
44. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.501 (West 2011).
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thirty-five states do not provide for any local consumer protection
enforcement, whether criminal or civil.45
C. Barriers to Local Legislation
The next logical question is: why not solve this problem by enacting
and enforcing local consumer protection laws? That would be the
most localist approach to expanding consumer protection, and some
localities have passed such laws.
The problem is that local legislative efforts are subject to challenge
under preemption' and powers47 doctrines.' As Paul Diller
observed, "when a city adopts a new policy that differs from state law
and may harm some segment of the business community, a
preemption challenge is almost certain to follow."49 When it comes to
consumer (and environmental) protection, it has been difficult even
for states to enact laws that hold up against federal preemption
challenges. For this very reason, legal scholars including Amy
Widman,o Rachel Barkow," Gillian Metzger,52 and Margaret Lemos"
have suggested that Congress grant state government actors standing
to enforce federal law. Even absent a preemption threat, it may be
45. See Appendix.
46. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal.
2005) (sustaining a preemption challenge to a local consumer protection ordinance).
47. See, e.g., Hunters Anglers and Trappers Ass'n of Vt. v. Winooski Valley Park
Dist., 913 A.2d 391, 395 (Vt. 2006) (considering and rejecting a powers challenge to
local law).
48. See generallyEngel, supra note 22.
49. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2007)
(urging a more relaxed approach to state preemption to allow for greater local
experimentation); Nicholas P. Miller & Alan Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57
WASH. L. REV. 85 (1981) (preemption of local laws regulating cable television);
Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, Inc., Truth-In-Lending Act Does Not Preempt City
Consumer Protection Law, 89 BANKING L.J. 345 (1972) (preemption of local laws
regulating banks); see also Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 812
P.2d 916, 925-30 (Cal. 1991), which provides a concrete example. In this case, the
City of Los Angeles, a home rule city, imposed a local license tax on a savings and
loan association. The California Supreme Court struck down the ordinance on state
law preemption grounds, finding bank taxes to be a matter of statewide rather than
local concern. Id. at 915, 931.
50. Widman, supra note 1, at 166-67 (urging Congress to promote regulatory
enforcement of federal product safety laws by granting states standing to enforce
federal law).
51. See generally Barkow, supra note 4.
52. See generally Metzger, supra note 20.
53. See generally Lemos, supra note 20.
[ ol. XL1912
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impractical for localities to enact consumer protection legislation at a
time when business is moving decidedly in not just a national but
global direction. Compared to Congress and the state legislatures,
localities are not terribly well positioned to enact consumer
protection legislation. But compared to federal and state agencies,
localities are uniquely well positioned to enforce consumer protection
legislation.
D. Barriers to Private Enforcement Actions
This Article makes the case that we need more public enforcement
of consumer protection laws-but why? Most little Acts permit
private enforcement;" why isn't private enforcement enough? Legal
scholars and jurists have ably explained the multiple barriers to
private enforcement of consumer protection laws. They include:
(1) Private Arbitration Agreements- Corporations have
increasingly turned to arbitration agreements to prevent
consumers from bringing disputes into court, and courts have
energetically backed those agreements." The efficacy of
arbitration (as opposed to litigation) is subject to spirited
scholarly debate.56 For purposes of this Article, we need only
observe that, because public entities like cities and counties are
not signatories to consumer arbitration agreements, they can
bring enforcement actions into court.
(2) Class Action Requirements Courts have increasingly tightened
class action requirements-most recently the requirement of
commonality-limiting private litigants' ability to vindicate
consumer interests.57  A government actor who brings an
enforcement action files on behalf of the public at large rather
than a specified class, and thus need not satisfy any of the usual
class action requirements.
(3) "Actual Injury" Standing Requirements- Courts often apply
stringent "actual injury" requirements in citizen suits, which can
restrict private plaintiffs' ability to stop corporate
54. See Appendix.
55. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-
Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323 (2011).
56. See generallyid.
57. See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality,
and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013).
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malfeasance." A government actor seeking to enjoin an unfair
business practice on behalf of the public at large is typically not
subject to the same stringent "actual injury" requirements.59
(4) Aggressive Litigation Tactics- When the plaintiff in a consumer
lawsuit is an individual or group of individuals, corporate
defendants have the option of engaging in a war of attrition via
the discovery process.? A government actor who brings an
enforcement action on behalf of the public at large is subject to
much more limited discovery, because such cases focus on the
defendant's conduct or whether the defendant is violating the
law,61 and not on whether the plaintiff in the case is at fault.
(5) Bankruptcy Stays- Corporations seeking bankruptcy can seek a
stay of private consumer protection enforcement actions. 62
However, corporations cannot seek a stay in public
enforcement cases. Due to this distinction, public
enforcement of consumer protection laws against bankrupt
corporations (along with efforts to recover funds via the
bankruptcy process) may continue even though a bankruptcy
filing would have halted private enforcement immediately.
58. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). The "actual injury"
requirement has been hotly debated in the consumer protection context. See
generally id. As of 2004 (when California citizens enacted Proposition 64) a private
plaintiff only has standing to invoke the statute if he or she personally "suffered
injury in fact" in the form of a loss of money or property as a result of the challenged
practice. Pulliam, supra note 33, at 1282. Ballot materials in support of Proposition
64, a statutory ballot measure that passed fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent,
stated that some private plaintiffs' attorneys were using section 17200 to generate
attorney's fees without creating a corresponding public benefit. See id. at 1294. The
supporters sought to put an end to suits brought on behalf of plaintiffs who had not
been personally economically harmed by the challenged business practice. See id At
least one commentator has called for state legislatures to eliminate the "actual
injury" requirement for a business competitor of the defendant who seeks to pursue a
representative claim for unfair business practices. See id. at 1285-86.
59. See, e.g., Green v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981).
60. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635
(1989).
61. See In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 37-38 (Cal. 2009).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012).
63. See id.
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E. Why Consider Local (Rather than Additional State or
Federal) Consumer Protection Enforcement?
The best reasons to consider local enforcement rather than simply
adding more state or federal enforcement of consumer protection
laws are proximity, industry capture, and the need to increase local
government sophistication.
With respect to proximity, "localities are the primary site for many
areas of public policy at the center of modern life."' They operate
not only as governments, but also as public corporations.65 They are
simultaneously playing the game and watching from the sidelines.
This dual vantage point makes them uniquely suited to the role of
corporate watchdog. Indeed, one could fairly argue that-as among
our three levels of government-localities are the most immediately
steeped in the world of commerce, and thus uniquely positioned to
assist with consumer protection enforcement.
With respect to industry capture, Margaret Lemos has argued
forcefully that disaggregating enforcement of federal law to the states
would help maintain robust enforcement in the face of federal agency
"capture" by corporate interests." The same could be said of
disaggregating enforcement of federal and state law to local public
entities. 67  That's not to say cities and counties would not be
vulnerable to capture; the question of local government capture
would have to be studied closely.
Finally, with respect to the need to increase local government's
economic sophistication, consumer fraud schemes are becoming ever
more complex.' To fend against the next wave of corporate
64. Davidson, supra note 25, at 968.
65. See Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement
in Local Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM,
AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 51 52-53 (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2010).
66. See Lemos, supra note 20, at 706 (explaining that non-federal government
enforcement of federal law disrupts the monopoly on enforcement). Professor
Lemos posits that there are two types of public enforcement. Id. at 699. This Article
contends that there are three.
67. A recent example is San Francisco's suit against California under the Federal
Gas Pipeline Safety Act. See generally Complaint, City & Cnty. of San Francisco. v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. C 12-0711, 2013 WL 2433811 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2013).
San Francisco alleges that both federal and state agencies charged with ensuring gas
pipeline safety have been captured by the energy industry, utterly undermining
enforcement and placing lives at risk. See generallyid
68. The debacle involving securitization of mortgages is a classic example of how
complicated and dangerous corporate malfeasance has become.
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malfeasance, we need our local government employees to be
sophisticated enough so they can catch and help defend against
harmful corporate behavior.
II. EXPANDING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
A. Municipal Right of Action Under FTC Act
Congress could enact the most sweeping expansion of local
consumer protection enforcement by granting large cities and
counties standing to seek injunctive relief and penalties under the
FTC Act. Taking this step would transform the Act into a procedural
vehicle akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though aimed (of course) at
corporate rather than government malfeasance. If state legislatures
were willing to grant localities standing under the little Acts then
local public standing under the FTC Act would not be absolutely
essential. But granting standing under the FTC Act would be the
fastest, most efficient, and most comprehensive means of drawing
cities and counties into consumer protection enforcement.69
B. Municipal Right of Action Under the Little Acts
Alternatively (or additionally), state legislatures could amend the
standing provisions in consumer protection statutes to grant cities and
counties the ability to enforce them. This Article employs
California's version of a little Act-California Business & Professions
Code Section 17200-as an active example to allow us to envision
how this move might play out. Section 17200 serves as a solid model
for two reasons. First, because its language closely mirrors the FTC
Act's language, tracking how section 17200 has operated in California
over the past few decades gives us a reasonably reliable picture of
69. The federal government could opt for a narrower alternative to granting local
government standing to enforce the Act. It could opt to enter into contracts with
selected localities to enforce the Act, as it has in the immigration context. See
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 591-92 (2008) (discussing § 287(g) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which authorizes localities to enter into agreements with the federal
government to enforce federal immigration laws). Contract-based enforcement has
the potential to be both narrower and broader than statutory enforcement: narrower
because cities and counties would gain enforcement powers-if at all-contract-by-
contract, jurisdiction by jurisdiction; broader because the contract could in theory
allow the locality to do more than just file suit. See id. Some § 287(g) agreements
allow localities to engage in direct enforcement as if they were federal agents. See id.
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how a "national section 17200" might operate.o Second, California
courts rely heavily on federal court interpretations of the FTC Act to
interpret section 17200," which helps us picture a "national section
17200" from a jurisprudential perspective.
By all accounts, localities with standing to enforce section 17200
have found it to be flexible and powerful.72 It is flexible because, like
the FTC Act, section 17200 has both substantive and procedural
components. Substantively, section 17200 permits courts to set new
standards of fair and unfair business practices in response to the
endless creativity of business models.7 3 Procedurally, section 17200's
prohibition against any "unlawful" conduct means plaintiffs can
"borrow" violations of other statutes that may or may not themselves
provide for private rights of action.74 Yet also importantly, section
17200 checks the possibility that appellate courts might issue
70. California has a population of over thirty-eight million. State & County
OuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html
(last updated June 27, 2013). California has the ninth largest economy in the world.
MAC TAYLOR, CAL FAcrs 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/
reports/2013/calfacts/calfacts_010213.pdf.
71. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 543 (Cal.
1999) ("In view of the similarity of language and obvious identity of purpose of the
[the Act and section 17200], decisions of the federal court on the subject are more
than ordinarily persuasive." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. For a discussion of how one city has made the most of section 17200's
flexibility and power, see generally Morris, supra note 65.
73. As the California Supreme Court put it nearly eighty years ago:
The fact that a scheme is original in its conception is not a good argument
against its circumvention. It has been said in . .. one of the leading cases on
unfair competition in this state: The fact that the question comes to us in an
entirely new guise, and that the schemer has concocted a kind of deception
heretofore unheard of in legal jurisprudence, is no reason why equity is
either unable or unwilling to deal with him. It has been said by some judge
or law writer that no fixed rules can be established upon which to deal with
fraud, for, were courts of equity to once declare rules prescribing the
limitations of their power in dealing with it, the jurisdiction would be
perpetually cramped and eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's
invention would contrive.
Am. Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (internal quotation
marks omitted). California courts continue to develop substantive law under section
17200 as circumstances require. See Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Whitter & Co.,
95 Cal Rptr. 2d 258, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("The Legislature ... intended by this
sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct
in whatever context such activity might occur." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
74. For a recent explication of section 17200's operation and reach, see Hinojos v.
Kohl's Corp., 718 F. 3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Roskind, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 251.
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overbroad or inconsistent rulings by requiring localities to inform the
state Attorney General if an appellate court takes an appeal or writ
involving judicial interpretation of that statute.
Section 17200 is also powerful for several reasons. It allows
localities to challenge indirectly business practices that are unlawful
even if they lack the power to regulate those practices directly (that is,
even if direct oversight is committed exclusively to state agencies),
and even if the underlying substantive law cannot be directly
enforced. Also, section 17200 reaches not only current but also past
unlawful acts or practices if they are likely to recur." Local
enforcement of state and federal consumer protection laws can be
conducted by in-house city and county counsel, or alternatively, by
law firms hired to represent those entities.
Finally, under California law, if a local public entity recovers civil
penalties in a section 17200 action, that entity not only can but must
use those funds for future enforcement of consumer protection laws.
In other words, California local consumer protection enforcement,
when successful, is self-funding. But when that system is not
successful (that is, when a case is brought that is legally or factually
75. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17209, 17536.5 (West 2012). Because this
requirement is not jurisdictional, the Attorney General may be notified after the
appeal is taken as long as the appellate court grants the State an opportunity to be
heard before it issues a legal interpretation of section 17200. See Californians for
Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 627-28 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods., 999 P.2d 706
(Cal. 2000).
76. See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097
(Cal. 1998) (explaining the reach of section 17200), superseded by statute as stated
in Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009). Each act that constitutes a
violation of section 17200 can potentially carry a separate civil penalty. See Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17206.
77. For example, the law firm of Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy filed eight federal
lawsuits on behalf of various California municipalities, alleging that banks rigged the
benchmark interest rate tied to trillions of dollars of loans and financial products
worldwide, thereby increasing their profits at the expense of institutional investors,
including their clients. See Vanessa Blum, Cotchett Firm Stakes Claim in LIBOR
Mess, RECORDER (Cal.), Jan. 9, 2013. Potential damages have been estimated to be
upwards of one trillion dollars. See id. In California, when law firms represent public
entities, in-house municipal counsel must control the litigation to avoid potential
conflict-of-interest issues. See County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21,
35 (Cal. 2010) (approving the use of contingency counsel in affirmative litigation by
municipalities as long as the litigation was ultimately controlled by public lawyers,
who have a higher duty of neutrality than private plaintiff's attorneys).
78. SeeBus. & PROF. CODE § 17206.
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tenuous), it is not self-funding. This simultaneously encourages good
and discourages bad (that is, specious) public enforcement.
Overall, section 17200 has had a tremendously positive impact on
the rights of California consumers. One scholar has described court
decisions applying section 17200 as having "chang[ed] the maxim
'caveat emptor' into 'caveat vendor."' 79
C. Practical Barriers to Local Consumer Protection
Enforcement
Local consumer protection enforcement would undoubtedly raise
significant practical barriers. This Article groups these barriers into
four categories-politics, money, culture and sophistication-and
comments briefly on each of them.
1. Politics
Granting localities standing to enforce state and federal consumer
protection laws would be politically bold. Even if state and federal
legislatures limited enforcement to localities with a population of
more than 50,000, that move would add more than one thousand
potential" corporate watchdog entities to the national and state
scenes. It is logical to expect such a proposal to provoke significant
corporate opposition, as have proposals for state enforcement of
federal laws." It is impossible to know whether, given the reality of
corporate funding in politics," consumer advocates in the public and
private sectors could ever overcome certain political opposition.
It is worth noting, however, that while this move would be
politically bold, it would not be truly radical. Local enforcement is
not new; localities have a long history of seeking injunctions against
corporations to abate economically harmful business practices,
including in complex cases." Local government statutory standing is
79. See Wesley J. Howard, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial
Interpretation, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 721 (1979).
80. I say "potential" because no locality would be obliged to engage in consumer
protection enforcement, but it could if it were willing and able to do so.
81. See generally Widman, supra note 1.
82. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (ruling
that the First Amendment prohibits governments from restricting political
independent expenditures by corporations, associations, or labor unions).
83. A frequently used legal "hook" at the local level is the common law of public
nuisance. Perhaps the most successful local public nuisance case ever prosecuted was
San Francisco's case--brought in collaboration with several state attorneys general-
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not new: localities already have standing to enforce, and have been
successfully enforcing, various federal and state laws designed to
protect the general public." Corporate malfeasance across the nation
has reached a point where legal scholars" and public lawyers" are
pushing for increased criminal prosecution of corporate malfeasants.
A policy proposal that contemplates not criminal, but merely civil
consumer protection enforcement is more modest. Yet like criminal
enforcement, engaging in more robust civil enforcement also has the
potential for political upside." After all, local voters who are pro-
against the tobacco industry. See Morris, supra note 65, at 54. The case sought
successfully to recover county public health dollars spent to treat tobacco-related
illnesses. See City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, 957 F. Supp. 1130,
1137 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Morris, supra, note 65, at 54. San Francisco has recovered in
excess of $260 million to date and used most of the money to rebuild Laguna Honda
Hospital, a century-old county health care facility for low-income elderly and
disabled persons. See JOHN THOMAS, LAGUNA HONDA HOSPITAL REPLACEMENT
PROGRAM: QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT PRESENTED TO THE CITIZENS' GENERAL
OBLIGATION BOND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 2-3 (2012), available at
http://www.sfcontroller.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=3329; see also
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS TO COUNTIES AND CITIES
1999-2013, available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/
settlements/TMSAPCREV.pdf?.
84. To take two federal examples, localities have statutory standing to enforce the
federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7604(a)(1) (2006), and the Natural Gas
Pipeline Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). Additionally, in California,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, localities
have statutory standing to enforce little FTC Acts. See Appendix.
85. See Pulliam, supra note 33, at 1285 (urging state legislatures to eliminate the
"injury in fact" standing requirement when a business competitor of the defendant
seeks to bring a representative consumer claim for unfair business practices). In his
Article, Professor Pulliam called on state legislatures to grant standing under state
consumer protection statutes to business competitors, arguing that competitors are
more likely than either individuals or governments to learn of unfair business
practices and be in a position to sue. See id. at 1284-89.
86. See Press Release, Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley, Former Mortgage Broker
Sentenced to Serve at Least Two Years in State Prison for Role in Elaborate
Mortgage Fraud Scheme (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/2011/former-mortgage-broker-sentenced-to-serve-at.html;
Monique Bryher, Attorney General Brown Files Ciminal Charges Against Mortgage
Brokers, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/fraud-in-los-
angeles/attorney-general-brown-files-criminal-charges-against-mortgage-brokers. See
generally David Segal, Financial Fraud Is Focus of Attack by Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/business/12crime.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
87. To take the most prominent recent example, Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth
Warren, a first-time candidate, ran for Senate on a platform of holding corporations
accountable for harming consumers and the economy. See Katharine Q. Seelye,
Warren Defeats Brown in Massachusetts Senate Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-massachusetts-
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business may also have a strong law-and-order perspective. When
framed as law-and-order, local enforcement of the Act and little Acts
may yield political benefits for the responsible elected officials.
2. Money
Litigation costs money. How can cash-strapped localities take on
these cases? Many may be daunted by such a task and decline to use
enforcement powers even if they had them. On the other hand, the
absence of consumer protection enforcement is expensive for
localities since they are particularly hard-hit by the negative
consequences of unchecked corporate malfeasance.' Viewed in this
way, local enforcement of unfair business practices laws may
represent a wise local government investment. Moreover, if cities and
counties choose their cases wisely, they should recoup their initial
investment in relatively short order. Many of the Act and little Acts
have penalty provisions that can be leveraged to reimburse localities
(and ultimately, their constituents) for the cost of pursuing
enforcement actions against corporate lawbreakers.89 (These
provisions also provide a healthy check on overreach by local public
law offices, since the costs associated with unsuccessful cases would
not be reimbursed.) State and federal governments might consider
overcoming this financial barrier by lending seed money to localities
willing to engage in consumer protection enforcement so they get
their first docket of cases off the ground.
senate-scott-brown.html?_r=0. Although she was a Democrat running in a
traditionally Democratic state, political analysts partly attributed her popularity to
her promise to "hold the big guys"-corporations-"accountable." Id.
88. See generally PAULAIS, supra note 19 (documenting the devastating impact of
the financial crisis on local governments). Kathleen Engel made this point with
respect to predatory lending, when she wrote:
Predatory lenders penetrate communities and, like polluters, leave
distressed properties and desperate people in their wake. The task of
cleaning up falls to cities, yet predatory lending reduces the resources
available for this clean up. Declining property values resulting from
predatory lending mean reduced tax revenues just as abandoned buildings
lead to increased demand for fire and police protection. City budgets are
further strained when victims of predatory lending turn to cities for relief
programs and protection from abusive lenders. In the language of
economics, predatory lending imposes negative externalities on cities.
Engel, supra note 22, at 359-60.
89. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West 2012).
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3. Culture
Another practical concern is that local public law offices might not
initially embrace (or even understand) a role of consumer law
enforcement plaintiff. I have written that localities may be culturally
resistant to taking on this role for several reasons.' First, local
governments are often so cash-strapped it may be difficult for their
law offices to imagine doing more. Second, local public law offices
historically conduct almost entirely defensive litigation-that is, they
defend the locality when it is sued-and are not used to being
plaintiffs." But that resistance may be waning. As more and more
localities have engaged in affirmative litigation to the benefit of
constituents and their own bottom-lines, a growing number local
public law offices are open to plaintiff's litigation.' But in the end,
since each locality is the architect of its own docket, those that would
rather not participate could simply decline to use their new
enforcement authority.
4. Sophistication
Local public enforcement of the Act and little Acts raises the
practical barrier that many localities-and local public law offices-
may lack the sophistication to go after the kinds of complex corporate
schemes federal and state governments are accustomed to tackling.
That problem undoubtedly exists for many if not most cities and
counties at present. Ultimately, each locality would have to decide
what kinds of cases it can and cannot bring. The broad, flexible
language of the Act and little Acts, which prohibit "unlawful,"
"unfair," or "fraudulent" business practices, leave room for each
locality to pursue complex cases," simple cases,94 or some of each,
90. See generally Morris, supra note 65.
91. See id. at 52 (arguing that "often it is institutional culture, not legal barriers,
that bounds city and county law office activities"); Adam Liptak, Ban on Gay
Mariage Led Lawyers to Shift Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/us/san-franciscos-role-in-opposing-gay-marriage-
ban-led-way-to-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all (quoting the San Francisco City
Attorney's point that in order to pursue plaintiffs cases a local public law office must
first step out of its traditional defense role).
92. See Morris, supra note 65, at 60.
93. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties for Violations of
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, People v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, No.
CGC-08-473569 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2008) (pursuing a complex scheme by bank
and arbitration company); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers
(Guess Who Wins), Bus. WK., June 15, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/
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depending on its capacity and expertise. Importantly, as explained
earlier, the "lack of sophistication" argument is vulnerable to being
turned on its head. The flexibility of a "national section 17200" would
provide opportunities for an ambitious locality to expand its
economic and financial sophistication over time by tracking, case-by-
case, the trends, costs, and benefits of evolving business practices.
Local governments' increased sophistication would ultimately benefit
their constituents.
III. THEORETICAL CONCERNS DISAGGREGATION RAISES
A. Localism Concerns: What About Local Autonomy?
The central idea in this Article is a policy idea, namely that
localities can and should be invited into state and federal consumer
protection enforcement. This, however, is related to a broader
theoretical ambition-which is to craft a coherent, workable, and
constitutionally sound theory of the role localities do and should play
in our constitutional democracy. Put another way, we must move
towards a healthy and modern localism. That goal requires us to
grapple with potential localist critiques of proposals like the one
presented here.
The most serious localist argument against expanding local
enforcement of state and federal consumer protection laws is that
doing so would not further local autonomy and may even undermine
it. "Autonomy" has been a major theme in local government
scholarship since Gerald Frug revived the field in 1980.95 Local
government scholars have, for example, opposed local enforcement of
state and federal constitutional law on the ground that it would
undermine the push for more local autonomy." Needless to say, a
2008-06-04/banks-vs-dot-consumers-guess-who-wins. For a list of the wide range of
cases San Francisco has pursued under section 17200, see Morris, supra note 65, at
54-56.
94. See generally People ex. rel. Herrera v. Stender, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013) (pursuing a relatively simple action against a law firm and an attorney for
unfair business practices vis-A-vis immigration clients).
95. See generally Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1059 (1980).
96. See e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing
the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006) (arguing that local constitutional
enforcement undermines localism); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional
Actors.: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 152-53 (2005). But see
Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-
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purely localist approach to consumer protection legislation would be
to enact local law and then defend those laws against the inevitable
powers and preemption challenges.' This Article takes autonomy
seriously, and offers two observations on that subject in the context of
localism.
The first observation is that the traditional localist account of local
autonomy seems to focus, sub silentio, on legislative autonomy. That
is, by "autonomy" local government scholars seem to mean the ability
to declare what the law is at a local level and seal the locality off from
state and federal interference." Not all autonomy, however, is
expressed legislatively. Localities can also exercise executive
autonomy.9 9 In the context of civil law enforcement, local executive
autonomy takes forms such as exercising prosecutorial discretion,
prosecuting public interest litigation, and negotiating settlements in
the public interest. Viewed this way, local enforcement of federal and
state consumer protection law is a form of local (executive)
autonomy."
C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that local constitutional enforcement favors local
interests overall).
97. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 925-31
(Cal. 1991) (finding that the City of Los Angeles, a home rule city, imposed a local
licensing tax on a savings and loan association and striking down the ordinance on
state law preemption grounds, finding bank taxes to be a matter of statewide rather
than local concern); Diller, supra note 49, at 1114-15 (urging a more relaxed
approach to state preemption to allow for greater local experimentation because
"when a city adopts a new policy that differs from state law and may harm some
segment of the business community, a preemption challenge is almost certain to
follow"). See generally Engel, supra note 22; Miller & Beals, supra note 49
(discussing the evolution of local cable television laws); Warren, Gorham, & Lamont,
Inc., supra note 49, at 345 (discussing the preemption of local laws regulating banks).
98. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2257
(2003) (equating Home Rule with "autonomy"); Gerald Frug, Decenternng
Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 254 (1993) ("[The traditional account of
decentralized power] presents localities as being able to do whatever they want: they
can act in their own self-interest, cooperate with others on their own terms, and cause
harm to those who disagree with them. The political term for this form of autonomy
is 'sovereignty."').
99. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 69 (dissecting local § 287(g) agreements
with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and discussing how local executive
autonomy often expresses itself through the ability to move freely in the marketplace
by entering into private and public contracts).
100. Local enforcement of federal and state law may not pose the kind of threat to
state and federal power that local legislative autonomy does. At a basic level, local
legislative autonomy sends a "keep out" message. Local enforcement sends a very
different message, namely, "let's fix this." The latter message may be more likely to
realize the full benefits of cooperative federalism.
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Needless to say, if "local autonomy" means only local legislative
autonomy, then my proposal does nothing to advance it. But if that
term also includes executive autonomy, my proposal suggests that in
some areas-such as consumer protection-it might be worth giving
up autonomy on the legislative side of local government to gain more
autonomy on the executive side. Local enforcement of federal and
state consumer protection laws is a good example of a policy that
would simultaneously undermine local legislative autonomy and
strengthen local executive autonomy.
A second observation about localism and autonomy is that local
government scholars tend to treat maximizing local autonomy as an
end in itself, rather than as a path to power."o' "Power" and
"autonomy" are not synonymous and they do not always rise and fall
together." Localism's ultimate goal may be better aimed at
maximizing local power-rather than local autonomy. If we were to
set aside local autonomy as the ultimate goal of localism, and instead
define localism as the attainment of local power, we might shift our
focus to policy alternatives that increase power, whether or not they
increase autonomy. In each circumstance, rather than asking: what is
the clearest path to local autonomy in this context?; we would ask:
what is the clearest path to local power in this context?
In the consumer protection context, there are two potential paths
to local power: (1) enacting local consumer protection laws (then
fighting powers and preemption battles), or (2) using standing
doctrine to leverage state and federal consumer protection laws for
the benefit of local constituents. Increasing leverage rather than
autonomy would not only be easier to defend in court, it might
actually make better policy sense. As business moves nationally and
internationally, we may be better off setting basic standards at the
federal level and enforcing those standards at the federal, state, and
local levels rather than setting three layers of substantive standards.
By contrast, in other contexts, it may be a better policy to allow local
legislative autonomy.o3 In sum, perhaps instead of asking "what will
maximize local autonomy," a healthy, modern localism asks, "is
101. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990) (impliedly equating autonomy and
power).
102. See Morris, supra note 96.
103. See Rodriguez, supra note 69 (arguing in favor of local legislative autonomy in
the immigration context).
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autonomy, leverage, or some other means the best way to maximize
local power?"
B. Federalism Concerns: Uniformity, Over-Enforcement, and
Parochialism
In addition to localism concerns, local enforcement of federal and
state consumer protection laws raises at least three familiar
federalism concerns: (1) multiple enforcers of the Act and little Acts
would disrupt the existing uniformity of consumer protection law, (2)
the laws would be over-enforced as compared with the optimal level
of enforcement, and (3) localities would be prone to parochialism in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Lack of uniformity and over-enforcement concerns are also at play
when considering state enforcement of federal law, so federalism
scholars have begun to take an empirical look at these questions.
There are few data, and to the extent they exist they are
inconclusive." In the absence of data, it makes sense build in
common-sense legal safeguards that minimize the risks of dis-
uniformity and over-enforcement.
There is no question that allowing localities to enforce federal and
state consumer protection laws will weaken higher-level control. This
is an inevitable trade-off of all disaggregation. As Stephen Lee has
written in the immigration context a "diminished capacity for
oversight is often one of the trade-offs involved in disaggregating
enforcement authority. While such a design handicaps a principal's
powers of oversight, it often creates a competitive environment
among agents, which creates incentives for the agents to produce
better outcomes while deepening and broadening their expertise.""'
Those dangers should be controlled through legislative safeguards
such as notice provisions, certification provisions, or contract-
controlled local enforcement.'t '
104. See generally Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A
Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV.
1343 (2013).
105. Steven Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 1089,
n.104 (2011).
106. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 69 (discussing that some state statutes
require localities to provide notice before filing suit while others require local public
law offices to go through a certification process before commencing enforcement of
state law, and how a contract-based approach might be akin to so-called § 287(g)
agreements, which permit local enforcement of federal immigration laws).
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Turning finally to parochialism, as a practical matter, "[a]ny
argument for enhancing local autonomy requires a leap of faith that
local political institutions are worthy of that autonomy."'107 Thus, to
disaggregate consumer protection enforcement is to embrace a robust
vertical federalism, because each public laws office-federal, state
and local-would be permitted to exercise prosecutorial discretion
based on the needs and values of its constituent group. Put another
way, one person's "parochialism" is another person's "representative
democracy.""o
Even accepting parochialism as a real threat of disaggregation, it
may be that there are some contexts--such as consumer protection
enforcement-in which we may be able to tolerate a little
parochialism. After all, no matter who files a consumer protection
case, it is always going to be fundamentally built on facts that allege
one or more business actors, operating in a particular place, are
harming consumers and businesses in that same place. To some
degree, consumer protection enforcement may be inherently
parochial, and thus the perfect place to experiment with
disaggregation of enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Localities and their constituents need greater consumer protection
enforcement. But consumer protection laws need not be enacted at
the local level to be enforced there. Localities may not be well-
positioned to enact consumer protection statutes, but they are
uniquely well-positioned to enforce them. Perhaps the best way to
better control corporate malfeasance is not through local laws, but
local watchdogs.
107. Davidson, supra note 25, at 1019.
108. See Lemos, supra note 20, at 745 (discussing a similar idea).
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APPENDIX
Fifty-State Survey: State Consumer Protection Laws
Consumer
State Protection Description
Statute
The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act has a broad definition
of deceptive trade practices, ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (LexisNexis 2002),
AA C 819-1t and it grants enforcement authority to the Attorney General and
§8-19-1 District Attorneys. § 8-19-4(a)(1)-(a)(3). The penalty for violating
the Act is no more than $2,000. § 8-19-11(b). There is a one year
statute of limitations. § 8-19-14.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.50.471 to 45.50.479 (2012) list many
unlawful acts related to consumer protection. The Attorney General
of Alaska has authority to enforce the consumer protection laws. §
ALASKA 45.50.501(a). Additionally, the Code provides for private and class
STAT. §§ actions. § 45.50.531(a). The statute of limitations for private actions
45.50.471 to is two years. Id. at § 45.50.531(f). A victorious plaintiff may be
45.50.561 granted injunctive relief and attorney fees. §§ 45.50.535, 45.50.537.
These consumer protection laws cannot be waived. § 45.50.542. The
Attorney General can recover between $1,000 and $25,000 for
violations of the consumer protection laws. § 45.50.551(b).
ARIZ. REV. The Attorney General of Arizona has enforcement authority. ARIZ.
STAT. ANN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1524(A) (2013). The state may recover up to
A H 44-1521 to $10,000 for violations. § 44-1531(A).
55-1534
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ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-88-
101 to 4-88-
207
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The Attorney General of Arkansas, through the Consumer Counsel,
has civil enforcement authority of deceptive trade practices laws.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-104 (2011). The Consumer Counsel is an
administrative agency tasked with representing and protecting "the
state, its subdivisions, the legitimate business community, and the
general public as consumers." § 4-88-105(c). The Counsel has
investigatory and enforcement authority. § (d)(3). Violations of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Chapter are also Class A misdemeanors. §
4-88-103. Penalties paid to the state for violations are not to exceed
$10,000 and expenses. § 4-88-113(a)(3). Moreover, "[a]ny person
who suffers actual damage or injury as a result of an offense or
violation as defined in this chapter has a cause of action to recover
actual damages, if appropriate, and reasonable attorney's fees." § 4-
88-113(f). The statute of limitations is five years. § 4-88-115. Finally,
there are enhanced penalties when elder or disabled persons are the
targets of deceptive trade practices. §§ 4-88-201 to 207.
CAL. CIV. In addition to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200, the Civil Code
CODE §§ provides that "[a]ny consumer" harmed by unfair trade practices may
1750 to 1785; bring an action to recover damages and/or injunctive relief. CAL. CIV.
CA CODE § 1780(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). Individuals may bring
CAL. BUS. & class actions too. § 1781(a). The statute of limitations is three years. §
PROF. CODE 1783.
§§ 17200-509
The Attorney General and District Attorneys of Colorado have
authority to enforce Colorado's Consumer Protection Act. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 6-1-103 (2013). The Attorney General and district
COLO.REV, attorneys are granted broad investigatory authority, too. §§ 6-1-
CO STAT. § 6-- 107(1), 6-1-108(1). The remedies for violations of the Colorado
101 to 6-1-115 Consumer Protection Act include injunctive relief and penalties not
to exceed $2,000 per violation. §§ 6-1-110(3), 6-1-112(a). There are
also penalties for up to $10,000 for violating an injunction and for
deceptive trade violations to the elderly. § 6-1-112(b). There is a
three-year statute of limitations. § 6-1-115.
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Connecticut established a Department of Consumer Protection that
has authority to enforce consumer protection laws and regulations.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21A-1(a), 21A-7(1) (West 2006 & Supp.
CON. GN. 2013). The Commissioner has authority to order investigations into
STTANN. to deceptive trade practices. § 42-110d(a). Any person harmed by
CT 21A-1 to unfair trade practices may bring a private or class action seeking
10A-tDo 42- damages; there is a three year-statute of limitations. § 42-110g(a)-(b).110A to 42-
Moreover, "[t]he various state's attorneys and prosecuting attorneys
shall lend to the commissioner or Attorney General such assistance
as either may request in the commencement and prosecution of
actions pursuant to this chapter." § 42-1101
The Attorney General of Delaware may enforce consumer fraud
laws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2517(a) (2005). All money received
from such enforcement shall be placed in the Consumer Protection
Fund which shall be used to fund consumer fraud enforcement. tit. 6,
DEL. CODE § 2527(a) (Supp. 2012). Any individual harmed by deceptive trade
ANN. tit. 6, §practices may seek injunctive relief, and the Attorney General may
DE bring an action whenever a deceptive trade practice is likely to harm2501 to §
any person. tit. 6, § 2533(a), § 2533 (d). The Attorney General may
also seek civil penalties for no more than $10,000 for violations. §
2533(e). Formerly, tit. 6, § 2598 provided for civil penalties of up to
$25,000 for violations or injunctions enforcing consumer protection
laws; however, 77 Laws 2010, ch. 282, § 4 repealed this statute in June
2010.
The Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Chapter defines
"enforcing authority" as the state attorney and Department of Legal
Affairs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.203(2) (West 2010). The state
FLA. STAT. attorney and Department of Legal Affairs may bring actions for
ANN. §§ injunctive relief and actual damages, and the statute of limitations is
501.001 to two years. § 501.207. They may also seek penalties of up to $10,000
501.2101 for violations of Deceptive and Unfair Trade regulations. § 501.2075.
The penalties are increased for violations against the elderly. §
501.2077. All funds received through enforcement of the deceptive
trade laws shall be placed in funds that accrue to the state. § 501.2101.
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Georgia adapted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-370 (2009 & Supp. 2013). A person likely to be
damaged by a deceptive trade practice may seek injunctive relief. §
GA. CODE 10-1-737. The administrator (it is unclear which organization the
administrator is the oversees; the statute just says that he/she will
GA A"perform all functions formerly performed by the Consumer Services370 to 10-1- Unit"), advised by the Consumer Advisory Board, may issue orders
407 prohibiting unfair or deceptive business practices and seek injunctive
relief from courts. H§ 10-1-395, 10-1-397. The administrator may also
be granted civil penalties up to $5000 per violation. § 10-1-397. There
is a two-year statute of limitations. § 10-1-401.
Hawaii established an Office of Consumer Protection. HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 487-2 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). "The director of the
HAw. REV. office of consumer protection is designated the consumer counsel for
the State and shall represent and protect the State, the respective
HI T 487-2 to counties, and the general public as consumers." § 487-5. Accordingly,
487-16 it would be difficult to pass statutes granting local governments
enforcement authority because Hawaii has already explicitly
recognized the Director as localities' representation for consumer
protection purposes.
The Idaho Consumer Protect Act defines and governs unfair
methods of competition, solicitation, tax return preparation, unfair
telephone services, unfair bulk email advertisements, mortgage loan
modification fees, and unconscionable practices. IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 48-603A to 48-603F (2003 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney General
IDAHO CODE of Idaho may bring actions for declaratory judgment, injunctive
ID ANN. §O 48- relief, and damages. The state may recover damages on behalf of
601 to 48-619 consumers and up to $5000 in civil penalties. § 48-606. The court may
also "[m]ake such orders or judgments as may be necessary to
compensate any consumers for actual damages." § 48-607(2). Any
purchaser or lessee who suffers loss due to unfair practices may also
bring actions for restitution, and the court may award punitive
damages to such consumers. § 48-608(1). Civil penalties may be up to
$10,000 per violation. § 48-615.
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The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act defines a
number of unlawful practices. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 505/2 to
815 ILL. 505/2Jjj (West 2004 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney General or a
IL COMP. STAT. State's Attorney may bring actions for injunctive relief, and the courtANN. §§ 505/2 may impose a civil penalty of up to $50,000 (the statute does not say
to 505/12 that the civil penalty is per violation). § 505/7. Any person suffering
actual damages from a violation of the Act may bring an action for
damages. § 505/10a. There is a three-year statute of limitations. Id.
The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA) defines thirty-
six different categories of "deceptive acts" that are unlawful. IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-5.-0.5-3 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012). Any
person suffering from a deceptive act may bring an action for actual
damages; if deception as willful, damages may be up to the greater ofIND. CODE
IN ANN. § 24-5- triple the actual damages or $1000. § 24-5-0.5-4(a-b). The court may
0.5-1 award reasonable attorney fees. § 24-5-0.5-4(j). Private parties canbring class actions. § 24-5-0.5-4(b). The Attorney General may bring
an action to enjoin a specific deceptive act, or, if there is a pattern of
such acts, to issue an injunction ordering the supplier to return the
unlawfully received money to consumers. § 24-5-0.5-4(c). The statute
of limitations is six months. § 24-5-0.5-5.
Section 714 of the Iowa Code chapter on theft, fraud, and related
offenses gives a very broad definition of what constitutes consumer
fraud, including the intent that others rely upon "the concealment,
suppression, or omission of a material fact" related to the lease, sale,
IOWA CODE or advertisement. IOWA CODE § 714.16(2)(a) (West 2003 & Supp.
IA ANN. §H 2013). "The burden is on the person making the representation to714.16 to demonstrate that a reasonable basis for the claim existed." Id.
714.16A Enforcement power is with the attorney general. § 714.16(4)-(6). A
private party may bring civil actions and the attorney general can
request civil remedies of up to $40,000 per violation. § 714.16(7).
Section 714.16A allows the Attorney General to impose an additional
civil penalty up to $5000 per violation.
1932  Vol. XL
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The Kansas Consumer Protection Act instructs that it should be
construed liberally. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 (West 2008). The list
of "deceptive acts and practices" is extensive (fourteen categories),
and includes representations made knowingly or with reason to know
KAN. STAT. that it could be deceptive. § 50-626(b). Unlawfulness is not
KS ANN. §§ 50- contingent on whether the consumer has actually been misled by the
623 to 50-643 deceptive act. Id. Enforcement power is with the Attorney General.
§ 50-629. A consumer may bring a civil action and recover damages
(though not for class actions). § 50-634(b). In a class action,
consumer may recover an injunction and appropriate ancillary relief,
but not damages. § 50-634(c).
The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act provides for the creation of
a Consumers' Advisory Council and a Division of Consumer
Protection of the Department of Law for "aiding in the development
of preventative and remedial consumer protection programs and
enforcing consumer protection statutes." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
367.120(1) (LexisNexis 2008). The Consumers' Advisory Council is
made up of state citizens, chaired by the Attorney General, and
tasked with publishing an annual report on the state of consumer
KY. REV. affairs in the state. § 367.140. The Department of Law coordinates
KY SA AN. the consumer protection activities of the state, county, and city
§367.10 government; advises agencies and officials; conducts investigations,
research studies, and conferences; acts as a central clearinghouse of
information; and conducts consumer education programs. § 367.150.
The Attorney General has broad power to issue an injunction in the
public interest under section 367.190, and to investigate the matter
thoroughly under section 367.240. Anyone who was harmed by
practices made unlawful by this Act may bring a civil action and
recover actual damages and punitive damages. The statute of
limitations is two years since violation. § 367.220.
The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
voids any contract made in violation of its provisions. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1403 (Supp. 2013). The Attorney General has power toLA. REV, investigate, enforce, and educate the public. Section 51:1404 makes
LA STAT. ANN. rules interpreting this provision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1404§§ 51:1401 to (2003). Section 51:1405 allows for the issuance of injunctions.
51:1425 Requests for civil penalties can be increased if victim is elderly. §
51:1407. Individuals may bring private civil actions, not as
representatives of a class. § 51:1409.
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ME. REV. Maine adopted the Uniform Consumer Protection Act. Other
STAT. ANN. discrete consumer protection laws have separate enforcement
tit. 10, §§ statutes, but these provisions are scattered and barebones. See
1211-1216 generallyME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §H 1211-1215 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act gives weight to the FTC and
federal courts' interpretation of "unfair or deceptive trade practices"
but says the term should be construed liberally. MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 13-105 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012). It establishes a
MDAN., COE Gnrl 321 h iiin a u o nijnto ne ., M. Division of Consumer Protection in the Office of the Attorney
MD General. § 13-201. The Division can sue for an injunction underLAW §§ 13- section 13-406, and individuals can bring action for damages and101 to -501 reasonable attorney's fees under section 13-408 (2013). Penalties are
limited to $1000 per violation, and $5000 per subsequent violation. §
13-410. Criminal penalties of $1000 or up to one year in prison are
possible. § 13-411.
Massachusetts declares unlawful all "unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (LexisNexis
2012 & Supp. 2013). The law should be construed and amended with
MASS. GEN. an eye to the FTCA. Id. The Attorney General can bring actions on
MA LAWS ANN. behalf of individuals for injunction and actual damages. Ch. 93A, § 4.
ch. 93A, §§ 1- Individuals can bring civil actions for money damages and attorney's
11 fees and injunction. Ch. 93A, § 9, § 11. Individuals can bring class
actions. Ch. 93A, § 11. Civil penalties can go up to $5000 per
violation (and up to $10,000 per violation for failure to heed
injunction) and reasonable costs of litigation and attorney's fees. Ch.
93A, § 4.
The Michigan Consumer Protection Act gives a long detailed list of
what constitutes "unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts,
or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce." MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney
General can bring suit for fine of up to $25,000. § 445.905. The
MICH. CoMP. business has a chance to voluntarily desist and avoid suit. § 445.906.
MI LAWS ANN. The Attorney General can bring a class action on behalf of§445.901- individuals under section 445.910, and individuals can bring actions
.922 for injunction and damages on behalf of themselves under section
445.911. Prosecuting attorneys can also initiate actions. § 445.915.
The statute of limitations is the later of six years after occurrence of
the practice or one year after the last payment in a transaction
involving the practice. §§ 445.910-.911.
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The Minnesota law is not broadly defined. It bans misrepresentation
of price, quality of merchandise, and misrepresentation of "the true
nature of [a] business, either by use of the words manufacturer,
MNANN. STA. wholesaler, broker, or any derivative thereof or synonym therefor, or
MN 5DA09N.2 otherwise." MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.12-325D.13 (West 2011 &
Supp. 2013). Individuals can sue for injunction and damages. §
325D.15. The law does not provide for penalties or actions by the
attorney general or other state attorneys.
Mississippi established an Office of Consumer Protection. See MIss.
CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (West 1999), which enforces a ban on "unfair
methods of competition affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive
trade practices in or affecting commerce." § 75-24-5 (listing thirteen
examples). The Attorney General has power to bring suit. § 75-24-9.
District and county attorneys can bring suit. § 75-24-21. Individuals
MISS. CODE can bring suit for personal damages after trying informal adjudication
MS ANN. §§ 75- first. § 75-24-15. Class actions are not permitted. § 75-24-15.
24-1 to -29 Penalties are up to $10,000 per violation and up to double this if
violation was willful; half of the money goes to the Office of
Consumer Protection, and the other half goes to the General Fund. §
75-24-19. Local courts are reimbursed for their costs. § 75-24-21. The
statute provides for a fine of up to $1000 for a knowing and willful
violation, and up to five years in prison for subsequent violations. §
75-24-20.
The Missouri law prohibits "the act, use or employment by any
person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression,
or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or
advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce or the
solicitation of any funds for any charitable purpose." MO. ANN. STAT.
Mo. ANN. § 407.020 (West 2011). Individuals, local attorneys, and circuit
attorneys, as well as the Attorney General, can enforce the Act. §
M ST.10§309 407.020. Individuals can bring private civil actions and class actions
for personal losses, and can be awarded injunction, actual damages,
punitive damages, and attorney's fees. § 407.025. Penalties are up to
$1000 per violation. § 407.100. Additionally, the statute imposes a
fine of $5000 per violation for failure to comply with injunction. §
407.110. All penalties go to the Merchandising Practices Revolving
Fund and all other costs recovered go into the State Treasury. §
407.140.
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The Montana Consumer Protection Act protects against all "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce." MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-
103 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). Montana hinges its definition to the
FTCA; thus any new rules must be consistent with the FTCA. § 30-
14-104. The Act is enforceable by the entire Department of Justice.
§§ 30-14-111, 30-14-102 (defining "Department" and "County
MONT. Attorneys"). The Act is enforceable pursuant to a request by the
Department and individuals. §§ 30-14-121 to 30-14-133. Moreover,
MT C ANN. County Attorneys in counties with over thirty million dollars of§§ 30-14-101
to -143 taxable value may designate an employee to act as a full-time
investigator. § 30-14-122. Courts can grant injunctions and award
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. §§ 30-14-131 to 30-14-133.
There are penalties of up to $10,000 for willful violations and failure
to comply with injunctions or TROs, and a $5000 penalty with up to
one year imprisonment for failure to comply with the Act generally
(willful or not). § 30-14-142. Civil fines, costs, and fees go to the
Department or the county fund, depending on where action was
commenced. § 30-14-143.
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The Nebraska Consumer Protection Act makes unlawful certain
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 59-1602 to 1606 (2012). The Nebraska Attorney General may
enforce this Act in the name of the state. § 59-1608. Recoveries
received from the enforcement of the Act shall be placed in the State
Settlement Cash Fund or the State Settlement Trust Fund. §§ 59-
1608.04, 59-1608.05. The State may seek actual damages, injunctive
relief, and civil penalties of up to $25,000 for violations of sections 59-
1603 or 59-1604, and up to $2000 for violations of section 59-1602. §§
59-1609, 59-1610, or 59-1614. In general, the statute of limitations is
NEB. REV. four years. § 59-1612. Nebraska adopted the Uniform Deceptive
STAT. §§ 59- Trade Practices Act. §§ 87-301 to 87-306. The Uniform Deceptive
NE 1601 to 59- Trade Practices Act does not preempt the state's Consumer
1623, 87-301 Protection Act, which makes unlawful certain deceptive trade
to 87-306 practices, defined in section 87-302, including unconscionable acts.
§ 87-303.01. Anyone who violates the Act is guilty of a Class II
misdemeanor and subject to a civil penalty of not more than $2000
for each violation. § 87-303.11. Any person "likely to be damaged by
a deceptive trade practice of another" can bring an action for
injunctive relief. § 87-303. "Proof of monetary damage, loss of
profits, or intent to deceive is not required." Id. The statute of
limitations for civil actions is four years. § 87-303.10. The Attorney
General has, in addition to the power to bring a civil action, has the
power to require documentation from anyone he or she believes is
engaging in a deceptive practice or unconscionable act and issue a
cease and desist order without a hearing. §§ 87-303.02 to 303.03.
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Deceptive trade practices are defined in great detail in NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 598.0915 to .0925 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).
Those practices listed are also supplemented by practices "actionable
at common law or defined as such in other statutes" of the state. §
598.0953. Deceptive trade practices may be investigated by the
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, the Director of the Department
of Business and Industry or the Attorney General. § 598.096. The
Attorney General may additionally bring a criminal proceeding to
enforce the Act, or may bring an action on behalf of the state to
obtain injunctive relief or civil penalties. § 598.0963. In addition,
NEV. REV. county district attorneys can, in certain circumstances, bring actions
STAT. ANN. on behalf of the state to obtain injunctive relief or civil penalties.
§§ 598.0903 § 598.0985. A person who violates a court order or injunction issued
to 0999 pursuant to this Act is subject to a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000 for each violation, and a person found to have willfully
engaged in a deceptive trade practice is subject to a civil penalty of
not more than $5000 for each violation. § 598.0999. If the deceptive
trade practice is found to be toward an elderly or disabled person,
there is a civil penalty of not more than $12,500 for each violation. §
598.0973. Any funds recovered in a civil action, except criminal fines
and restitution, are deposited in a State General Fund and are used
only to offset the costs of enforcing the Act. § 598.0975. The statute
of limitations for bringing civil actions under this Act is six years.
§ 11.190.
A number of practices are defined as unfair methods of competition
or unfair or deceptive in the Act. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2
(2008 & Supp. 2012). The Attorney General may bring an action for
injunctive relief or for "an order of restitution of money or property
to any person or class of persons injured." § 358-A:4. Upon a finding
that a person has engaged in an unlawful practice, the court may
N.H. REV. award the state civil penalties up to $10,000. Id In addition, "[a]ny
STAT. ANN. person injured by another's use of any method, act or practice
§§ 358-A:1 to declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for
A:13 damages and for such equitable relief, including an injunction." § 358-
A:10. A victorious plaintiff will recover the amount of actual
damages or $1000, whichever is greater. Id. "If the court finds that
the use of the method of competition or the act or practice was a
willful or knowing violation of this chapter, it shall award as much as
3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount." Id A three year
statute of limitations applies to violations of the Act. § 358-A:3(IV-a).
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A number of practices are defined as unlawful, "whether or not any
person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby." N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2 to 56:8-2.10 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013). The
Attorney General may investigate potential violations and hold
hearings. § 56:8-3 to 8-3.1. He may assess a penalty against the
person alleged to have committed the violation, and any amount
N.J. STAT. collected goes to the State Treasury "for the general purposes of the
ANN. §§ State." § 56:8-3.1. Any person who violates the act is subject to a civil
2A:14-1; 56:8- "penalty of not more than $10,000 for the first offense and not more
1 to 56:8-25 than $20,000 for the second and each subsequent offense." § 56:8-13.
In addition, persons harmed and able to show an "ascertainable loss"
may initiate an action, and there is an additional automatic
imposition of treble damages. § 56:8-19. "[T]he director of any
certified county or municipal office of consumer affairs" can also
bring a suit. § 56:8-14.1. The statute of limitations for bringing a
cause of action under the Act is six years in New Jersey. § 2A:14-1.
The Unfair Practices Act makes unlawful certain "unfair or
deceptive" and "unconscionable trade practice[s]." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 57-12-2 to 12-3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
The Attorney General may bring actions in the name of the state for
injunctive relief. § 57-12-8. In addition, a person "likely to be
damaged by an unfair or deceptive trade practice or by an
unconscionable trade practice of another" may bring suit for an
N.M. STAT. injunction without needing to show "monetary damage, loss of profits
ANN. H§ 37-1- or intent to deceive." § 57-12-10. Any person "who suffers any loss of
NM 3 to 37-1-4; money or property" as a result of an unlawful practice under this Act
57-12-1 to 57- "may bring an action to recover actual damages or the sum of one
12-26 hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater," and if the practice was
willful, the court may award up to three times actual damages or
$300, whichever is greater. Id. If a person willfully used a method
unlawful under the Act, the Attorney General may recover from him
a civil penalty of up to $5000 per violation on behalf of the state. § 57-
12-11. The statute of limitations for bringing claims is six years for
written contracts and four years for unwritten contracts. §§ 37-1-3, 37-
1-4.
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New York law makes "[dieceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service"
unlawful. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2012). Both the
Attorney General and injured persons may bring actions for
injunctive relief, restitution, or damages. Id. The Attorney General
can recover civil penalties of up to $5000 for each violation, which
N.Y. GEN. shall accrue to the state. § 350-d. Individuals can recover actual
Bus. LAW damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, but if the court finds
NY the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the Act, the court can§§ 349 to 350- increase the award of damages "to an amount not to exceed three
F-1
times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars." § 349. If the
unlawful conduct is against an elderly person, the defendant is
additionally liable for up to $10,000 in civil penalties, which go
towards a state treasury fund used solely for the investigation and
prosecution of consumer frauds against elderly persons. § 349-c
(McKinney 2012). The statute of limitations in New York is six
years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2003).
North Carolina law declares all "[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce" unlawful. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1.1
(2012). The Attorney General has the power to initiate civil actions
for injunctive relief and damages. § 75-14. He also has the power to
"call to his assistance in the performance of any of" his duties the
N.C. GEN. "district attorneys in the State, who shall, upon being required to do
NC STAT. §§ 7 so by the Attorney General, send bills of indictment and assist him in1.1; 75-8 to the performance of the duties of his office." § 75-13. Any individual
75-16.2 found to have violated section 75-1.1 is liable for a civil penalty of up
to $5000 for each violation, which goes to the Civil Penalty and
Forfeiture Fund. § 75-15.2. Additionally, any person injured by a
violation of this Chapter has a right of action and can obtain treble
damages. § 75-16. The statute of limitations for these civil actions is
four years. § 75-16.2.
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The Attorney General has the power to bring suit on behalf of the
state to prevent and restrain violations of the provisions of the
Unlawful Sales or Advertising Practices chapter or other provisions
of law. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-15-07 (2007). He can collect a civil
N.D. CENT. penalty for each violation of up to $5000. § 51-15-11. In addition,
individuals are entitled to sue for damages and where the court finds
ND 01-16; 51-10- the defendant knowingly committed the conduct, the court may order
D 01-6 51-1-1 treble damages. § 51-15-09. Further, if the violation is of the Unfair
Trade Practices Law (Chapter 51-10), the several State's Attorneys
can institute a suit in addition to the Attorney General and harmed
individuals. § 51-10-06. All moneys recovered by the Attorney
General go to a treasury fund. § 54-12-18 (2008). The statute of
limitations in North Dakota for these actions is six years. § 28-01-16.
Deceptive trade practices are listed in OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 38 of the 130th Ga. Gen.
Assembly). A person injured or likely to be injured by another who
commits a deceptive trade practice may commence a civil action for
injunctive relief and damages. § 4165.03. Unfair or deceptive acts or
practices "in connection with a consumer transaction" are further
defined in section 1345.02, and "unconscionable" acts or practices are
defined in section 1345.03. The Attorney General may bring an
OHIO REV. action with respect to these unlawful practices for declaratory and
CODE ANN. injunctive relief. § 1345.07. The Attorney General can bring a class
OH §§ 1345.01 to action on behalf of consumers as well. Id. Suppliers who engage in
1345.13, violative practices may be liable for up to $25,000 in civil penalties.
4165.01 to Id. The statute of limitations for civil actions brought by the
4165.04 Attorney General is two years. Id One-fourth of civil penalties go to
the treasurer of the county in which the action is brought, and three-
fourths go to the consumer protection enforcement fund. Id.
Consumers harmed by violative acts also have a cause of action, in
which they can get injunctive relief, can rescind the transaction or can
recover actual economic damages plus up to $5000 in noneconomic
damages. § 1345.09. In certain cases the consumer can recover three
times the amount of actual economic damages or $200, whichever is
greater plus up to $5000 in noneconomic damages. Id
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The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act defines unfair trade
practices and deceptive trade practices at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, H§ 752,
753 (1996 & Supp. 2012). "The Attorney General or a district
attorney may bring an action" for declaratory or injunctive relief and
actual damages and penalties. tit. 15, § 756.1. Aggrieved consumers
also have a private right of action for damages. tit. 15, § 761.1. If the
violative act is also found to be unconscionable, the violator is also
liable to the aggrieved customer for the payment of a civil penalty,
recoverable in an individual action only, of up to $2000 for each
violation. Id. Any person found to be in violation of the Act in a civil
action must pay a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation, in
addition to any other penalties. Id. "Civil penalties or contempt
penalties sued for and recovered by the Attorney General or a
OKLA. STAT, district attorney shall be used for the furtherance of their duties and
OK tit. 15, §§ 751- activities under the Consumer Protection 
Act." Id.
765, tit. 78, §§ The Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act lists additional
51-55 unlawful practices at tit. 78, § 53. "Any person damaged or likely to
be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another" may bring a
civil action for injunctive relief and damages, although proof of actual
monetary damages, loss of profits, or intent are not required for an
injunction. OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 54 (2002 & Supp. 2013). The
Attorney General or a district attorney of the state is authorized to
bring an action against one who misrepresents the geographic
location of the supplier or lists a fictitious business name in a
directory assistance database seeking an injunction or recovery of
money unlawfully received from aggrieved customers (to be held in
escrow for distribution to the aggrieved customers). Id The statute
of limitations in Oklahoma is five years for contracts in writing, three
years for contracts not in writing, and two years for an action for
relief on the ground of fraud. tit. 12, § 95.
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Oregon law defines unlawful practices at OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 646.607, 646.608 (West 2003). A "prosecuting attorney who has
probable cause to believe that a person is engaging in, has engaged
in, or is about to engage in an unlawful trade practice may bring suit
in the name of the State of Oregon in the appropriate court to
restrain such person from engaging in the alleged unlawful trade
practice." § 646.632. Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of
money or property may also bring an individual action to recover
actual damages or statutory damages of $200, whichever is greater.
O. RE. § 646.638. The court or jury may also award punitive damages. Id.
OR SA AN. Actions must be brought within one year from the discovery of the
§646.605 unlawful method, act or practice, but "whenever any complaint is646.691 filed by a prosecuting attorney to prevent, restrain or punish
violations of ORS 646.608, running of the statute of limitations with
respect to every private right of action . . . based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof." Id. The court may set a civil penalty of
up to $25,000 for each violation of an injunction issued under section
646.632, each violation of an assurance of voluntary compliance
under section 646.632, and any willfully used method, act or practice
declared unlawful by sections 646.607 or 646.608. § 646.642.
The Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law grants
discretion to courts to provide damages to any "person in interest."
73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-4.1 (West 2008). The Attorney General
73 PA. CON. or "the appropriate District Attorney" may recover civil penalties (of
PA STAT. ANN. § up to $5000 for each violation) and equitable relief. § 201-8. The
201-1 to 201- Attorney General may "order the dissolution, suspension or
9.3 forfeiture of the franchise or right to do business of any person, firm
or corporation which violates the terms of an injunction issued under
section 4 of this act." § 201-9. The Act provides for private actions as
well. § 201-9.2.
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Rhode Island law defines "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices" at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-
13.1-1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012), and declares that these practices "in
the conduct of any trade or commerce" are unlawful in section 6-13.1-
2. The Attorney General may bring an action on behalf of the state
R.I. GEN. for injunctive relief. § 6-13.1-5. "Any person who purchases or leases
LAWS ANN. goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household
RI purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
6-13.1-1 t property" as a result of an unlawful practice may also bring an action
(or class action) to recover actual damages or $200, whichever is
greater. § 6-13.1-5.2. The court may award punitive damages. Id.
"Any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under
section 6-13.1-5 is liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per
violation. § 6-13.1-8. The statute of limitations generally for contracts
in Rhode Island is twenty years. § 9-1-17.
South Carolina law declares that "[u]nfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce" are unlawful. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (1976). The
Attorney General has the power to bring suit to enforce the Act, and
if a court finds that a person is willfully using an unlawful practice, he
is liable for a civil penalty of up to $5000 per violation. § 39-5-110. If
a person violates the terms of an injunction, he shall pay to the State
a civil penalty of up to $15,000 per violation. Id. In addition:
It shall be the duty of the solicitors of each judicial circuit
and all county and city attorneys to lend to the Attorney
S.C. CODE General such assistance as the Attorney General may
SC ANN. §§ 39-5 request in the commencement and prosecution of actions
10 to 39-5-170 pursuant to this article, or any solicitor or county or city
attorney with prior approval of the Attorney General may
institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same
manner as provided for the Attorney General; provided,
however, that if an action is prosecuted by a solicitor or
county or city attorney alone, he shall make a full report
thereon to the Attorney General, including the final
disposition of the matter.
§ 39-5-130. Any aggrieved individual may also bring an action to
recover actual damages, and if the court finds the violation to be
willful the individual can recover treble damages. § 39-5-140. The
statute of limitations for actions is three years. § 39-5-150.
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South Dakota defines certain deceptive acts or practices at S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
The Attorney General can bring an action on behalf of the state for
injunctive relief. § 37-24-23. In addition, "It shall be the duty of
state's attorneys to render to the attorney general such assistance as
the attorney general may request in the commencement and
S.D. prosecution by the attorney general of actions pursuant to this
CODIFIED chapter. The state's attorney with prior approval of the attorney
SD LAWS §§ 37- general may institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same
manner as provided for the attorney general and shall make a full
24-1 to 37-24-
48 report thereon to the attorney general, including the final disposition
of the matter." § 37-24-24. The Attorney General can recover a civil
penalty of up to $5000 for each violation of an injunction issued. § 37-
24-26. If the unlawful practice was intentionally used, the Attorney
General can recover a civil penalty of up to $2000 per violation. § 37-
24-27. In addition, any aggrieved person can bring a civil action for
the recovery of actual damages suffered. § 37-24-31. The statute of
limitations for actions under this chapter is four years. § 37-24-33.
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act lists many unlawful, unfair,
or deceptive acts or practices at TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104
(2010). The division of consumer affairs in the department of
commerce and insurance (the "division") has investigative powers,
subject to the approval of the Attorney General. § 47-18-106. The
Attorney General, at the request of the division, may bring an action
in the name of the state for injunctive relief. § 47-18-108. The court
may order payment to the state of a civil penalty of up to $1000 per
TENN. CODE violation. Id. In addition, any knowing violation of the terms of an
ANN. §§ 47- injunction or order is punishable by a civil penalty of up to $2000 per
18-101 to 47- violation. Id. Any aggrieved individual may also bring an action to
18-130 recover actual damages, and if the court determines the unlawful
practice was willful it may award treble damages. § 47-18-109.
Individuals must bring actions within one year from their discovery of
the unlawful act or practice and not more than five years after the
date of the consumer transaction giving rise to the claim for relief.
§ 47-18-110. Anyone who knowingly uses a method or practice which
targets elderly persons and is in violation of this Act is liable to the
state for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation. § 47-18-
125.
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Texas's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act lists
unlawful deceptive trade practices at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). The consumer protection division
has authority to bring an enforcement action for injunctive relief.
§ 17.47. In addition, the consumer protection division may request a
civil penalty paid to the state in an amount of up to $20,000 per
violation and an additional penalty of up to $250,000 if the practice
was calculated toward a consumer sixty-five years of age or older. Id.
Any person who violates the terms of an injunction shall pay a civil
penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $50,000.
TEX. Bus. & Id. District and county attorneys have a duty of assistance to the
CM. CODE consumer protection division, and they can institute and prosecuteANN. §§ 17.41 actions seeking injunctive relief with prior written notice to the
to 17.63 consumer protection division. § 17.48. Individual consumers may
also maintain actions in certain circumstances for economic damages
and injunctive relief. § 17.50. If the trier of fact finds that the
defendant's conduct was committed knowingly, the consumer may
also recover damages for mental anguish, not to exceed three times
the amount of economic damages. Id. Consumers can also file class
actions. § 17.501. Under certain conditions, consumers may waive
the provisions of this Act, but such a waiver cannot be a defense to an
action brought by the Attorney General. § 17.42. All actions must be
brought within two years of the date on which the false, misleading,
or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the
consumer should have discovered the occurrence. § 17.565.
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act lists certain knowing and
intentional acts as deceptive acts or practices at UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-11-4 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013). The code declares that
such acts or practices by a supplier in connection with a consumer
transaction violate the Act. § 13-11-5. The Division of Consumer
Protection has enforcement authority under the Act. § 13-11-7. The
UTAH CODE Division of Consumer Protection can bring an action for declaratory
ANN. §§ 13- or injunctive relief or actual damages on behalf of consumers who
11-1 to 13-11- complained to it. § 13-11-17. It can also bring a class action on behalf
23 of consumers for actual damages. Id. The court may impose a civil
penalty of up to $5000 for each day an injunction is violated, and all
civil penalties are paid to the General Fund. § 13-11-7. Individual
consumers may also bring actions to obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief or actual damages (or $2000, whichever is greater). § 13-11-19.
Consumers can also bring class actions. § 13-11-20. The statute of
limitations for actions is two years. §§ 13-11-17, 13-11-19.
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Vermont law declares unlawful all "[u]nfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in commerce."
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012). "No actual
damage to any person need be alleged or proven for an action to lie
under this chapter." tit. 9, § 2457. The Attorney General or a state's
attorney, if authorized to proceed by the Attorney General, may
bring an action in the name of the state for injunctive relief, a civil
VT. STAT. penalty of up to $10,000 per violation, and an order of restitution on
behalf of a consumer or a class of consumers similarly situated. tit. 9,
VT 4AN.it.6A § 2458(b)(1). However, "[a]ny state's attorney receiving notice of2451-2466A
any alleged violation of this chapter shall immediately forward
written notice of the same with any other information he may have to
the 'office of the attorney general, attention consumer protection
division."' tit. 9, § 2462. Any person who violates the terms of an
injunction issued shall pay the state a civil penalty of up to $10,000
per violation. tit. 9, § 2461(a). Any aggrieved consumer may also
initiate an action for injunctive relief or damages. Id. The statute of
limitations for civil actions in Vermont is six years. tit. 12, § 511.
The Virginia Consumer Protection Act declares unlawful certain
fraudulent acts or practices committed by a supplier in connection
with a consumer transaction at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-200(A), 59.1-
200.1(A) (2006 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney General, attorney for
the Commonwealth, and the attorney for a county, city, or town have
investigative powers. §§ 59.1-201(A), 59.1-201.1. These parties may
also initiate civil proceedings for injunctive relief without needing to
VA. CODE prove damages. § 59.1-203(A). In addition, if the court finds the
defendant willfully engaged in an unlawful act, the court may impose
VA 196. to 59.1- a civil penalty of up to $2500 per violation. § 59.1-206(A). Any
207 taggrieved person may also initiate an action to recover actual
damages or $500, whichever is greater and, if the violation was
willful, the trier of fact may increase damages to an amount up to
three times the actual damages or $1000, whichever is greater. § 59.1-
204(A). The statute of limitations for individual actions is two years,
but when any government agency files suit, the time during which
such governmental suit and all appeals therefrom is pending shall not
count as any part of the period within which an action shall be
brought. § 59.1-204.1(A)-(B).
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Washington's Consumer Protection Act declares unlawful "[u]nfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.020 (West 2013). The Attorney General may bring an action
in the name of the state, or as parens patriae on behalf of persons
residing in the state, for injunctive relief. § 19.86.080(1). Any injured
person may also bring a civil action for actual damages, and the court
WASH. REV. may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to up to three
CODE times the actual damages sustained by not to exceed $25,000.
W H 19.86.01- § 19.86.090. Any person who violates the terms of any injunction
19.86.920 issued shall by a civil penalty of up to $25,000. § 19.86.140. Civil
penalties also apply to violations of §§ 19.86.020, 19.86.030, and
19.86.040 in the amounts of $2000, $100,000, and $100,000,
respectively, and the penalties are higher for corporations. Id The
statute of limitations for damages actions is four years, but the
running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the
pendency of any action brought by the Attorney General. §
19.86.120.
West Virginia law defines certain unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102
(LexisNexis 2007). Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of
money or property as a result of the use of one of these practices may
bring a civil action to recover actual damages or $200, whichever is
w. VA CODE greater, or an injunction, only after informing the seller or lessor inW. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 46A- writing of the alleged violation and providing the seller or lessor
6-101 to 46A- twenty days to make a cure offer. § 46A-6-106. In addition, the
WV 6-110, 46A-7- Attorney General, after notice and hearing, may order a creditor or
101 to 46A-7- other person to cease and desist from engaging in violations. § 46A-7-
115 106. Respondents aggrieved by an order of the Attorney General
may obtain judicial review. Id. The Attorney General may also bring
a civil action for injunctive relief. § 46A-7-108. If the court finds that
the defendant "has engaged in a course of repeated and willful
violations of this chapter," it may assess a civil penalty of up to $5000
for each violation. § 46A-7-111. The statute of limitations for actions
is four years. Id
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Wisconsin law defines certain practices as unlawful and deceptive at
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West 2010). Any person suffering
pecuniary loss because of a violation of this section may sue to
recover such monetary loss. § 100.18(11)(b)(2). The statute of
WIS. STAT. limitations for such actions is three years after the occurrence of the
ANN. § 100.18 unlawful act. § 100.18(3). The Department of Agriculture, Trade and
Consumer Protection (the "Department") or the Department of
Justice, after consulting with the Department, or any district attorney,
upon informing the Department, may commence an action in the
name of the state for injunctive relief. § 100.18(11)(a).
The Wyoming Consumer Protection Act prohibits unfair and
deceptive acts and practices in consumer transactions. It is enforced
by the Attorney General's Office (specifically, the Consumer
Protection Unit), which can seek civil penalties, injunctions, and legal
fees for violations. Civil Penalties are capped at $10,000 per violation
of provisions of the act and $5000 per violation of injunctions. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-113(a)-(c) (2013). These fees may be waived if
the violator has provided restitution or reimbursement to inured
parties. Jail time is also a possible punishment for certain violations.
WYO. STAT. Depending on the violation, the statute of limitations for the actions
ANN. §§ 40- brought under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act range from
12-101 to 40- one to two years after discovery of the unlawful practice. § 40-12-109.
12-114 Private parties can also seek damages for injuries suffered as a result
of violations of the Act. § 40-12-108(a). The Attorney General
appears to be the sole enforcing authority and there is no mention of
the abilities of municipalities to enforce the act. Additionally, there
is a separate section specifying that remedies provided in the act are
the exclusive remedies for actions brought under it. § 40-12-114.
Overall, the illegal practices are fairly broadly defined. There is a
long list of examples of specific violations, but the act also includes
the catchall phrase "engages in unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
§ 40-12-105(a).
